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INTRODUCTION 
 
The empirical studies of Tinbergen (1942), Abramovitz (1956), and Solow (1957) have 
demonstrated that only part of the historically observed increase in productivity can be 
explained by the increase of capital relative to labor. The greater part of this increased 
productivity is due to our increased knowledge of the world and its laws. These results do not 
directly contradict the neoclassical view of the production function as an expression of 
technological knowledge. All that has to be added is the obvious fact that knowledge is 
growing in time. Naturally this implies that knowledge is an economic good, more precisely a 
factor of production, for there is a positive return to an increase in knowledge. But then the 
problem which arises is that the market for knowledge as a good is not well developed.  
 
In fact, one of the major contributions of Arrow in the sixties consists in his exposure of the 
imperfect feature of market for information or knowledge3. Although Kenneth Arrow is 
probably best known for his contributions to methods of direct decision making and the theory 
of ideal market decentralization , he laid much of the groundwork for subsequent discussion on 
alternative methods of organization. By pointing out and developing the relationships between 
the competitive allocation mechanism and other planning procedures , he caused us to focuss 
                     
1 I owe much to professors Michel Beaud , Ghislain Deleplace , Arnold Heertje , as well as to Christophe 
Defeuilley, and a referee for helpful comments and criticisms. 
2The author is Associate Professor, University of Paris 8 (Saint-Denis) , 2 rue de la Liberté , 93200 Saint-Denis. 
3 Arrow indifferently employs "knowledge" and "information": "I speak here of 'knowledge', but one could 
equally speak of  'information'. I avoid the latter word here because of its technical implications in the theory of 
communication" (Arrow, 1965a, p. 192). 
  
on issues such as information gathering , communication efficiency , and transmission costs in 
deciding among forms of economic organisation . As many other economists , I think " it is fair 
to say that he [ Arrow ] set an agenda for the future in his presidential adress to the American 
Economic Association in 1974 and in his Fels lectures ( The Limits to Organization ) ... He 
pointed out the need for a better understanding of information costs and how they should be 
measured ; he suggested that many of the problems faced in understanding the structure and 
operation of large organisations could be analyzed only by bringing information and 
communication channels more directly into the agenda of economists ; and he advanced the 
view that the concept boundaries between internal and market allocations should be analyzed 
in those terms ." ( Heller S. , and Starrett D. A. , eds. , vol. III , part II , p.189 ). The purpose 
of this article is to explore different aspects of Arrow's theory of information and to sketch 
some critical orientations on the issue which have been raised and discussed widely in recent 
litterature that bypass the original analytical framework of Arrow's theory. 
 
Ruminating upon the specificity of information as a " good " in competitive markets , Arrow 
notes that "strictly speaking, knowledge lacks two properties that are important for a good that 
is to be bought or sold freely on competitive markets : 1) it can be possessed only imperfectly, 
and it is difficult to prevent others from using it ; 2) the use of knowledge in productive 
activities obeys the law of increasing returns, since the given need for knowledge in a given 
activity is independent of its scale. It follows from these remarks that neither the demand for 
nor the supply of knowledge satisfies the conditions of a competitive market." (Arrow 1965a, 
pp. 191-192). Consequently, any analysis with regard to the impact of knowledge on 
productivity and economic performance should start by an inquiry on the nature of 
information. 
 
Henceforth , the first chapter will discuss the nature of information. The second and the third 
chapters will treat respectively the production and the transmission of knowledge. Finally , the 
fourth chapter will be consacrated to the limits of Arrow's theory in light of recent litterature 
on the economics of information. 
 
I) THE NATURE OF INFORMATION 
 
The neoclassical approach suggests that competition ensures the achievement of a Pareto 
optimum under certain hypothesis. It usually assumes, among other things, that  1) the utility 
functions of consumers and the transformation functions do not display indivisibility (more 
strictly, the transformation sets are convex). The first hypothesis conceals two assumptions of 
the usual models: it prohibits uncertainty in the production relations and in the utility functions, 
and it requires that all the commodities relevant either to production or to the welfare of 
  
individuals be traded on the market. This will not be the case when a commodity for one 
reason or another cannot be made into private property. 
 
We have, then, three of the classical reasons for the possible failure of perfect competition to 
achieve optimality in resource allocation: indivisibilities, inappropriability, and uncertainty. For 
Arrow (1962a, pp. 104-120; 1962b, pp. 129-142; 1965a, pp. 191-199), the interesting fact 
about the information (or knowledge) is that it is subject to all of the three elements of market 
failure. 
 
I-1. Uncertainty 
 
Information becomes a commodity whenever uncertainty is present (Arrow, 1962a, p.110). 
Suppose that in one part of the economic system an observation has been made whose 
outcome, if known, would affect anyone's estimates of the probabilities of the different states 
of nature. This kind of subjective probability distribution, due to the uncertainties about the 
different possible states of the world, has first been introduced to economic literature by M. 
Allais (1953, pp. 269-290), K. Arrow (1959, chapter 3, volume 2, collected works), G. Debreu 
(1959, chapter 7). Such observations arise out of research, but they also arise in the daily 
course of economic life as a by-product of other economic activities. An entrepreneur will 
automatically acquire a knowledge of demand and production conditions in his field which is 
available to others only with special effort. Information will "frequently have an economic 
value, in the sense that anyone possessing the information can make greater profits that would 
otherwise be the case (Arrow 1962a, pp. 110). 
 
I-2. Indivisibility 
 
A given piece of information is by definition an indivisible commodity, and the classic problems 
of allocation in the presence of indivisibilities appear here (Arrow, 1962a, p. 112). The owner 
of the information should not extract the economic value that is there, if optimal allocation is 
to be achieved ; but he is a monopolist, to some small extent, and will seek to take advantage 
of this fact. In the absence of special legal protection (for example, patent laws), the owner 
cannot, however, simply sell information on the open market. Any one purchaser can destroy 
the monopoly, since he can reproduce the information at little cost or no cost. Thus the only 
effective monopoly would be the use of the information by the original possessor. This, 
however, will not only be socially inefficient but also may not be of much use to the owner of 
the information either, since he may not be able to exploit it as effectively as others. "With 
suitable legal measures, information may become an appropriable commodity. Then the 
  
monopoly power can indeed be exerted. However, no amount of legal protection can make a 
thoroughly appropriable commodity of something so intangible as information."(Arrow,Ibid.) 
 
I-3. Inappropriability 
 
The demand for information also has uncomfortable properties. In the first place, the use of 
information is certainly subject to indivisibilities. The use of information about production 
possibilities, for example, need not depend on the rate of production. In the second place, 
"there is a fundamental paradox in the determination of demand for information ; its value for 
the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it 
without cost. Of course, if the seller can retain property rights in the use of information, this 
would be no problem, but given incomplete appropriability, the potential buyer will base his 
decision to purchase information on less than optimal criteria." (Arrow, 1962a, p. 111) 
 
It follows from the three afore-mentioned properties of information that the creation of a 
perfect competitive market for information is impossible. (Arrow, 1962a, p. 111; 1965a, p. 
192; 1965b, p. 204) 
 
The two principal problems in the analysis of information (or knowledge) as an economic good 
are those of production and transmission. In the first stance, we attempt to present Arrow's 
theory of the production of knowledge; then we will examine his position on the transmission 
of knowledge. 
 
II) PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
According to Arrow, production of knowledge can be realized in two ways : 1) practice ; 2) 
research. The first way, practice, is what the great American philosopher and educator John 
Dewey has named "learning by doing". In his inquiry on the fruits of  the social division of 
labor, A. Smith (1776) study the positive feedbacks of this type of learning (Smith, 1970, 
p.112). According to all theories of learning, people learn from experience. Given a problem, 
the individual makes explanatory responses and observes what happens. He chooses and 
retains responses that satisfy ; he rejects the responses that do not give satisfaction. It is the 
experience of problems that motivates learning, that is, the increase of knowledge. 
 
However, one can start from a general scientific principal (nuclear fission, for example) and 
seek its field of application. In this case, we are dealing with a second way of learning, namely 
the research. Both methods (practice and research) lead to increased knowledge. (Arrow, 
1965a, p. 192). 
  
A production function, if it shifts as a result of increased knowledge, can shift in many ways. In 
a two-factor model, Hicks spoke of "capital-saving" and "labor-saving" innovations and raised 
the question of whether the bias is itself induced by economic considerations (J.R. Hicks, 1939; 
see also Arrow, 1961, pp. 225-250). Fellner (1962) convincingly argued that factor prices, per 
se, should have no tendency to cause bias, since the aims of the entrepreneur is to minimize 
total costs. Kennedy (1964) then sought to carry the Fellner analysis further by introducing 
explicitly the trade-offs between different possible biases in innovation. Kennedy, like many 
other writers, had tended to replace the Hicks classification by introducing a more explicit and 
restricted model of technological change, namely, factor augmentation: 
 
Y=F[A(t)K, B(t)L] 
 
where Y is output, K is capital, L is labor, and A(t) and B(t) are the total augmentations of 
capital and labor, respectively. Then there is postulated a "transformation function" for 
knowledge, in the form of a trade-off among the rates of growth of A and B and research 
expenditures. "Knowledge" as reflected in the variables A and B, appears as an input to 
physical output, and we then need to supplement the ordinary production relation with an 
additional relation determining these newly defined inputs. 
  
The originality of Arrow's contribution relies in his criticism of Kennedy's model and his 
contention that technological progress is in the first instance a reduction in uncertainty. 
According to Arrow (1969, pp. 297-306), the production of a research and development effort 
is an observation on the world that reduces its possible range of variation. The outputs of 
different research projects are qualitatively different ; there is no gain in acquiring the same 
information twice. The production of knowledge is thus basically different in character from 
the production of goods, where successive items can be qualitatively identical. 
 
Research and development are thus intimately connected with the problems of uncertainty 
reduction. Let the term "activity" be used as usual for any process described by inputs and 
outputs, but we are particularly interested in the case where the outputs are not known with 
certainty. It can easily happen that the outcomes for different activities will be dependent 
random variables in the sense of a subjective probability. The case most interesting from the 
present point of view is that where there is an underlying unknown parameter on which the 
probability distribution of outcomes for the different activities depend; then observing the 
outcome of one activity changes the a posteriori distribution of outcomes of the other. Arrow 
suggests the Bayesian language to be used for formulating this kind of subjective probability: 
"If I really believe that a pair of dice is fair, observing any outcome is of no use in predicting a 
subsequent one. But if I suspect bias and I express my suspicions by an appropriate subjective 
  
probability distribution over the possible outcomes, then observing an outcome certainly does 
change my subsequent expectations in accordance with Bayes's theorem" (Arrow, 1969, p. 
299). 
 
Thus, an activity will in general have two valuable consequences: the physical outputs 
themselves, and the change in information about other activities. On the basis of this 
conceptual framework, Arrow proposes to classify two methods of producing knowledge. In 
production of knowledge by practice ("learning-by-doing"), the " motivation for engaging in 
the activity is the physical output, but there is an additional gain in the information, which 
may be relatively small, that reduces the cost of further production" (Arrow, 1969, p. 300). In 
production of knowledge by research ("search")" the actual output (for example, of nylon) is 
of negligible importance compared to the information gain- a posteriori the probability that 
a substance with the properties of nylon can be produced is now 1, whereas  a priori it may 
have been a small figure." (Arrow, Ibid.) 
 
Once these polar cases are presented, it becomes clear that intermediate cases are possible, and 
in fact the majority of research and development expenditures are actual steps in the 
production process, such as design, engineering, tooling, manufacturing, and marketing start-
up costs (see for example: Mansfield, 1968, p. 106). Each stage involves uncertainties with 
regard to costs and, at the end, with regard to demand. At each stage, then, something is 
learned with regard to the probability distribution of outcomes, for future repetitions of the 
activity. At the same time, the physical outputs are expected to be directly valuable.      
 
II-1. Learning-by-Doing 
 
For Arrow, learning is the product of experience and it can only take place through the attempt 
to solve a problem and therefore only takes place during the activity. In this respect, learning-
by-doing is mainly the outcome of "previous experiences in modifying the individual's  
perception" rather than "insight" in the solution of problems (Arrow, 1962b, p. 158). 
Moreover, Arrow cocedes that learning associated with repitition of essentially the same 
problem is subject to sharply diminishing returns (Arrow, Ibid.). There is an equilibrium 
response pattern for any given stimulus, towards which the behavior of the learner tends with 
repitition. To have steadily increasing performance, then, implies that the stimulus situations 
must themselves be steadily evolving rather than merely repeating. 
 
The following empirical evidence can be cited to support Arrow's hypothesis : 
 
  
 1) The most dramatic evidence is based on the observations of the aeronautical 
engineer T.P. Wright (1936). In the production  of airplanes of a given model, the quantity of 
labor necessary for each airplane diminishes from one to the next according to a very exact 
simple formula specifically, the labor used for the Nth airplane of a given model is proportional 
to N-0,3 (Arrow, 1962b, p.159)4. Hirsch (1959) has shown that a similar law holds for the 
construction of some types of machines. These relations are called progress curves. 
 
 2) The statistical studies of Kendrick (1961, table 60, p. 207) and Salter (1960, pp. 
123-124) have shown that industries whose production increases most rapidly have the most 
rapid increase in productivity (cited in Arrow, 1965b, p. 193). 
 
 3) Erick Lundberg (1961, pp. 129-133) wrote about a Swedish steel mill, Horndal, that 
had no investment for fifteen years; nevertheless, its output per worker increased by 2% per 
annum (cited in Arrow, 1962b, p.159). 
 
It follows from the above-mentioned empirical evidence that knowledge derived from 
"learning-by-doing" is a by-product of production or of investment. In research, on the 
contrary, it can be said that knowledge is the primary product. 
 
Several authors have advanced the hypothesis that productivity grows differently according to 
what form of production is involved. P.J. Verdoorn (1959, pp. 433-434) has suggested the 
application of progress curves at the national scale. T. Haavelmo (1954, secs. 7.1, 7.2), among 
other models, has proposed one in which knowledge is a factor of production, while it is itself 
produced by investment. Nicholas Kaldor (1961, sec. 8, 1961-1962, pp. 176-177) has 
proposed a relation between the rate of increase in labor productivity and the rate of 
investment per worker. Like Haavelmo and Kaldor, Arrow considers investment to be the 
moving force of learning. Furthermore, Arrow assumes that the process associated with a 
given machine obeys a law of fixed coefficients ; for each machine, then, a given quantity of 
labor is needed to obtain  the given output. New machines are better than old ones . 
 
Let G be the cumulative gross investment. Let 
E(G)= labor used on the Gth machine, 
Y(G)= capacity of the Gth machine, 
X= total output  
L= total employment of labor 
 
                     
4 Arrow's interest in the aeronautical engineering is rooted in his period of military service during world war II 
as a weather officer. See, Arrow, 1949, pp. 1-23. 
  
The function E(G) decreases or at least does not increase with G ; Y(G) increases or at least 
does not decrease. Therefore, the newer machine is always used in preference to the older. 
Finally, let G' be the serial number of the oldest machine used. Then 
 
G 
(1) X=   Y(G)dG 
G'  
 
G 
(2) L=   E(G)dG 
G' 
 
The variables X, L, G, and G' are all functions of time. If one assumes full employment of 
labor, which is the most natural hypothesis for the analysis of growth, L(t) is the labor force, 
and it is given exogenously. One can find G'(t) from (2) and then X from (1). Let U(G) and 
W(G) be the indefinite integrals of E(G) and Y(G), respectively. U(G) and W(G) are increasing 
and possess  
 
inverse functions, U-1 (u) and W-1 (v). 
   
  (3) X=W(G) - W(G') 
  (4) L=U(G) - U(G') 
  from (4) we have :  (5) G'= U-1  [U (G)-L] 
  and therefore, 
  (6) X=W(G)-W{U-1 [U (G)-L]} 
 
Which is a production function in a new sense. Output is a function of total gross investment 
up to the present moment, although only the portion beginning with G' is used. Arrow shows 
that the production function (6) obeys the law of increasing returns to scale (see Arrow, 
1962b, pp. 161-179 ; 1965a, pp. 194-198). In Arrow's model, technical progress by doing has 
the effect of creating a law of increasing returns. But for this purpose, he includes in the 
definition of capital the memories of obsolete machines. Moreover, Arrow's model, which is in 
our view the modelization of A. Smith's analysis of positive feedbacks, proves that the greater 
the rate of growth of wages and the rate of increase of total output, the greater is the rate of 
growth of the labor force. It is a strongly anti-Malthusian conclusion. Evidently, the growth of 
productivity can be more effective if the labor force increases more rapidly. The greater 
increase of output in turn causes a more rapid increase of saving and therefore of investment, 
which makes the process of learning grow still more rapidly. 
 
 
  
II-2. Search 
 
Contrary to the learning-by-doing case, Arrow does not propose any model for "search". In 
fact, such a model was later formulated by R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter (1980, 179-202). 
However, Arrow, like Nelson and Winter, acknowledges the close relation between "search" 
and uncertainty. According to Arrow, "The central economic fact about the process of 
invention and research is that they are devoted to the production of information. By the very 
definition of information, invention must be a risky process, in that the output ( information 
obtained ) can never be predicted perfectly from the inputs" ( Arrow, 1962a, p. 111 ). By a 
"risky process", Arrow means the subjective probability distribution of outcomes in a Bayesian 
sense. Borrowing Langlois terminology (Langlois, 1984) inspired by the Knight's famous 
distinction between risk and uncertainty (Knight, 1933), we can suggest that a "risky process" 
in Arrow's sense corresponds to a "parametrical uncertainty" and not a "structural uncertainty". 
Parametric uncertainty refers to lack of knowledge regarding the parameters of the problem. 
This type of uncertainty is combined with knowledge of the structure of the problem and all 
possible states of the world. Structural uncertainty, on the other hand, involves lack of 
information about the fundamental nature of the problem and the type of outcomes that are 
possible. For Arrow, search as a "risky process" is riddled with uncertainty, nevertheless this 
uncertainty has a parametric or stochastic nature.  
 
Our discussion regarding the production of information in Arrow's analysis may be summed up 
in the following taxonomy. 
 
Production of Information 
 
Type of Information 
Production 
Learning-by-doing Search 
Type of Product Information as a by-product of 
output or investment 
Information as a primary product 
Type of Market Imperfect market due to 
uncertainty,indivisibility,and 
inappropriability 
Imperfect market due to 
uncertainty, indivisibility, and 
inappropriability 
Type of Uncertainty Parametric uncertainty 
(Bayesian procedure) 
Parametric uncertainty (Bayesian 
procedure)   
Change in Phy. Output Primary (progress curves) Negligible 
Change in Information Negligible Primary (risk and moral hazards) 
Returns to Scale Continuous and 
increasing(positive feedback) 
Discrete and increasing (positive 
feedback) 
Time Endogenous Endogenous 
  
Modelisation Present (a new function of 
production) 
Absent 
Type of Analysis Dynamic equilibrium 
(intertemporal) 
Dynamic equilibrium 
(intertemporal) 
Type of Learning Individual rational learning 
(dexterity of individual worker) 
Individual rational learning (talent 
of the inventor) 
Basis of Learning Experience,problem-solving 
capacity (insight : negligible) 
Application of a general scientific 
principle 
 
As it can be inferred from this taxonomy, for Arrow, the production of information is 
intertemporal (Arrow, 1962c) and  riddled with uncertainty (although a parametric one). 
Moreover, the information market is by its nature imperfect. 
 
In his recent contributions on the economy as an "evolving complex system", Arrow 
particularly underlines the capital importance of these phenomena : "So far, the presentation 
has taken no account of time.... On the hypothesis that markets exist for all commodities at all 
times, the general competitive equilibrium model implies a time path of equilibrium 
dynamics. The hypothesis that all markets for all future times exist today is, of course, 
unrealistic, but it is equivalent to the assumption that all individuals correctly anticipate all 
future prices, the so called rational-expectations hypothesis. Furthermore, much recent 
analysis has gone into models which modify the hypothesis of complete markets by assuming 
that some markets for future commodities do not exist today and are not replaceable by 
expectations." (Arrow, 1988, p. 276). 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that the standard assumptions of equilibrium theory, such 
as diminishing returns, concave utility functions, etc. manifestly cannot be applied to the 
production of information which is marked by positive feedback and exponential explosions. 
 
III) TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
For Arrow, the understanding of transmission of knowledge is of special importance in two of 
the key socioeconomic problems of our time: international inequalities in productivity and the 
failure of the  educational system in reducing income inequality (Arrow, 1969, p. 302). The 
two problems have a considerable formal similarity. If one nation or class has the knowledge 
that enables it to achieve high productivity, why is the other not acquiring that information? 
That a nation or class has a consistently high productivity implies a successful communication 
system within that nation or class, so the problem turns on the differential between costs of 
communication within and between classes. Arrow writes: "The productivity differences 
among nations at a given moment are in great measure differences in the state of their 
  
knowledge, and these differences can exist only because transmission is so slow" ( Arrow, 
1965b, p. 192 ). Arrow does not evidently assert that difficulties in communication of 
information are necessarily the sole source of total factor productivity differences. He concedes 
elsewhere that there can be withholding of information to perpetuate monopoly positions ; and 
both in foreign trade and in economic relations between the races, "income differentials can 
arise from exploitation" ( Arrow, 1969, p.303 ). Nevertheless, for Arrow, communication 
problems are a "major and perhaps predominant source of productivity and income 
differentials" ( Arrow, Ibid. ). 
 
What are the causes of these differential channel costs? Replying to this question, Arrow 
remarks the role of personal contact in diffusion of information. Mass media may provide 
some overall alertness to change, but, except for the most alert and daring innovators, it is the 
example and the advice of those known personally that are apparently most potent in securing 
acceptance of innovation. Arrow suggests two principles for casting light on the basic factors 
at work in the difficulties of transmission of knowledge across nations and through educational 
system :  
 
1) A channel has greater capacity if the receiver regards it as more reliable. This is why 
personal contacts are frequently so important.  
 
2) To a large extent, channels of communication serve purposes other than the diffusion of 
innovations (for example, friendship and convenience) and the direction of diffusion may be 
dictated by factors in addition to profitability ( Arrow, 1969, p. 304 ). Thus informational 
channels, which typically have fewer other purposes to serve, are more expensive. In 
particular, personal contacts across nations are obviously much less extensive than within 
nations. That explains the importance of national trajectories in communication and diffusion of 
knowledge. In amplification of the first principle, there is one special case of unreliability from 
the receiver's point of view that is particularly stressed by Arrow : the inability for the receiver 
to understand the message. Every piece of the information "can be regarded as transmitted in a 
code and can only be used if decoded" ( Arrow, Ibid. ). In the first instance, a language itself is 
a code, and the sheer difficulty of translation perhaps can be underestimated. There are also 
problems in nonverbal forms of communication. More subtly, there are class and racial 
differences in the meaning of words, not so much in the literal denotation but in the 
connotations and associations, and in the significance of nonverbal behavior. In the 
complicated interplay of messages between teacher and student, the unreliabilities of 
communication can lead to extreme inefficiencies. 
 
  
On the basis of these two principles, Arrow develops his theory of "Higher Education as a 
Filter" (1974a). As it is already noted, for Arrow, a channel has greater capacity if the receiver 
regards it as more reliable. That explains why the education has to be largely considered as a 
device to screen out abler persons for employers, and that, therefore, only a small part of 
earnings differentials by education can be attributed to the education per se. This position is 
explicitly contrary to the results achieved by Human Capital theory as well as to the 
assumptions of classical microeconomics. According to Gary S. Becker : "My own opinion is  
that schooling-as-screening must occur in a world with imperfect information, but is a 
relatively minor influence in determining earnings differentials by education" ( Becker G., 
1983, p. 6). 
 
In fact, Becker rightly underlines the close relation between the hypothesis of "imperfect 
market information" and the theory of "schooling-as-screening". Less than a year before the 
publication of Arrow's article on "Higher Education as a Filter", Stiglitz advocated the theory 
of "screening" on the basis of his theory of market imperfection (Stiglitz, 1973). Arrow also 
acknowledges the relation between filter theory of education and the imperfect information and 
explores the historical background of such an explication , among others , in the writings of 
Herbert Simon : " The filter theory of education is part of a larger view about the nature of the 
economic system and its equilibrium . It is based on the assumption that economic agents have 
highly imperfect information . In particular , the purchaser of a worker's services has a very 
poor idea of his productivity . In this model , I assume instead that the buyer has very good 
statistical information but nothing more ...The general point that information in the real world 
is much more limited than that assumed in our usual equilibrium models has a long history 
among critics of the mainstream of economic thought . In recent years , it has been especially 
stressed by Herbert Simon and his followers . The particular emphasis on lack of information 
concerning the productivity of workers has been argued by me in the context of racial 
discrimination in employment ...and in a more general way, by A. Michael Spence in a recent 
Harvard dissertation..." ( Arrow , 1974a , pp.52-53 ).  
 
Furthermore, Arrow's theory of transmission relies on the relevance of personal contact in 
"coding" and "decoding" the information as signals. This emphasis on personal ties (that cannot 
be reduced to profitability considerations) undermines the fundamental assumption of classical 
microeconomic about the isolated individuals. Arrow's theory of transmission captures the 
interdependence among individual choices. One can influence the choice of his "friend" or 
"partner" and hence can formulate a strategic choice. In opposite to classical microeconomic, 
new microeconomic starts from Arrow's assumption of the interdependence among individual 
choices. Finally, national trajectories is one of the major explanatory factors of costs of 
transmission. 
  
Summarizing our presentation of Arrow's theory of transmission, we propose the following 
causal chain : 
 
 
(1) Information as a non-ordinary commodity  (2) Imperfect market for information  (3) 
Interdependence among individual choices  (4) Personal ties (networks) and national 
trajectories  (5) Coding and decoding signals  (6) Schooling-as- screening 
 
 
IV) THE LIMITS OF ARROW'S THEORY 
 
The originality of Arrow's theory with regard to the imperfection of the information market, 
and with regard to schooling as screening notwithstanding, his approach suffers from some 
serious pitfalls. We suggest a critical review of Arrow's theory in respect to the following four 
major topics: 
 
1) Codifiable Knowledge , Tacit Knowledge , and Mental Models : Arrow treats learning 
as the progressive discovery of pre-existing 'blueprint' information, or Bayesian updating of 
subjective probability estimates in the light of incoming data. As G. Dosi (1988), G. Hodgson 
(1993-1994), and Nelson (1980) have argued, this is a very limited way of conceiving of the 
role of learning, which in reality is much more than a process of blueprint discovery or 
statistical correction. Learning is not simply the acquisition of codifiable knowledge. There is 
also tacit knowledge, as F. Hayek (1945), F. Knight (1933), M. Polanyi (1967), and many 
others have described. For instance, as it is argued by Knight, the tacit nature of 
entrepreneurial competence makes it non-communicable and non-contractible. Furthermore, 
problems do not themselves provide nor necessarily suggest solutions : much learning must 
involve intuition and creativity or "insight", as already remarked by Gestalt and other field 
theorists, and particularly by the proponents of evolutionary approach. ( Dosi, 1991, p. 6 ; 
Hodgson, 1993-1994, p. 9 ). 
 
Recent developments in cognitive science reveals the importance of mental models even in a 
single model of communication . Paul Churchland (1989 ) describes a simple model of 
communication for two agents in which the knowledge representation of the agents plays a key 
role in the communication . Agent L ( for local ) has made a decision inside her ( his ) mind , 
and wishes to explain the basis for the decision to her ( his ) supervisor , agent C ( for center ) . 
The patterns in L's mind must first be encoded in a language , such as English . This encoding 
would be perfect if there were a known set of dimensions in which to measure the factors that 
used L to make the choice she did , and if she could state her measurements of each of these 
  
dimensions . This would constitute sufficient statistics for the decision , and communicating 
this data would be a perfect substitute for the neural patterns in L's mind . But the problem is 
that we almost never know what factors actually influenced a decision we have made . Much 
of our understanding in a choice situation can be tacit knowledge . We perceive things which 
we are not even consciously aware of , but which can affect a decision . Attempts to determine 
the factors and their weights can be made , but the basic problem is that we are always 
uncertain as to the dimensions of the knowledge space that must be measured . As a result , the 
encoding is almost certainly to be imperfect , and not all the information used by L to make the 
decision can be placed in the communication channel . The communication channel itself may 
be noisy and imperfect , and this problem has been studied extensively . This problem is a 
purely technical one and is not the cause of problems on which we wish to focus here . Instead 
, the decoding process at the listener , C , causes the next important communication problem . 
The listener must transform the message in the communication channel into changes in the 
neural patterns in her mind . The decoding is affected by the pre-existing patterns already in the 
listener's mind . The reception of a message and its interpretation by the listener are strongly 
influenced by the categories and beliefs that the listener already has about the world . To the 
extent that the speaker and a listener have common features in their mental models for the 
concepts identified in the shared mental model , they are more likely to be able to encode and 
decode their internal ideas into a shared language , and more likely to be able to effectively 
communicate using single terms to stand for substantial pieces of implicit analysis embodied in 
the shared mental model . 
 
Mental models are shared by communication , and communication allows the creation of 
ideologies and institutions in a co-evolutionary process . The creation of ideologies and 
institutions is important for economic performance ( North D. 1990 ) , as there exist gains 
from trade and production that require coordination . As various authors have written 
(Favereau O. , 1995 ; Orléan A. , 1994 ; North D. , 1990 , 1993 , 1994a , 1994b) , a market 
economy is based on the existence of a set of shared values such that trust can exist. According 
to North , " The morality of a business person is a crucial tangible asset of a market economy , 
and its nonexistence substantially raises transaction costs . LaCroix ( 1989 ) develops a model 
in which this intangible asset becomes a group-specific asset for a homogenous middleman 
group ( such as Jewish , Indian or Chiniese traders in a society in which they are a minority ) . 
A small group that maintains itself differentiated from the rest of society can enjoy much lower 
transaction costs than could two randomly chosen members of the society . " ( North D. , 
1994a , p.20 ). 
 
Mental models , institutions and ideologies all contribute to the process by which human beings 
interpret and order the environment . What lacks in Arrow's theory of knowledge , is  that it 
  
does not take into board the framed and tacit knowledge , or mental models and their 
changes . In one of his very recent contributions , Arrow acknowledges the Hayekian's 
distinction between " scientific knowledge " and " tacit knowledge " ( Arrow , 1994 , p.6 ) . 
Arrow calls scientific knowledge and the more transmittable parts of technological knowledge 
together as " reproducible knowledge ". He writes : " In many ways , the distinction between 
reproducible and tacit knowledge is parallel to that between evolutionary and conscious 
changes in social organisation . " However , he does not analyze the implications of the 
introduction of such concepts as tacit knowledge , or evolutionary changes in his model of 
rational learning and general equilibrium . Furthermore , in treating the " technological 
knowledge " , he neglects all the contributions of Michel Polanyi , as well as those of Nelson 
and Winter with regard to the tacit part of this type of knowledge , and the routine character 
of capabilities . By so doing , he implicitly admits that the analysis of tacit knowledge , 
evolutionary changes , institutions , ideologies and routines , i.e. , what creat human beings 
history , does not belong to the domain of general equilibrium . 
 
2) Rationality and Learning : The agents in Arrow's model remain rational and learning is 
defined as "the acquisition of knowledge" ( Arrow, 1962b, p. 158 ). In other words, for 
Arrow, learning is essentially a "rational learning" which occurs in the framework of the 
equilibrium analysis. The question which arises is how can agents be said to be rational at a 
given moment when they are in the process of learning? The very act of learning means that 
not all information is possessed and global rationality is ruled out. Artificial, probabilistic 
waverings to a model of an otherwise globally rational process of decision making do not 
provide an adequate remedy. Yet learning is more than the acquisition of information. It is the 
development of the modes and means of calculation and assessment, or as Hodgson remarks it 
is a kind of "representation" of reality, and thus, a "framed" knowledge (Hodgson, 1988, pp. 5-
6). If the methods and criteria of "optimization" are themselves being learned how can learning 
itself be optimal? By its nature, learning means creativity and the potential disruption  of 
equilibrium. The phenomenon of learning is antagonistic to the concepts of rational 
optimization and equilibrium. 
 
Learning is not simply the acquisition of knowledge , but also changes in mental models . Once  
mental models are reduced to " codifiable knowledge " , the usual modeling of learning in 
economics would involve Bayesian ideas . The Bayesian learner starts out with some sort of 
prior distribution of beliefs over some pre-defined model space involving the learner's current 
ideas about how to think about the phenomenon that is the object of the learning . The prior 
beliefs are updated by some direct learning which generates observational data . This transition 
of prior beliefs into posterior beliefs with an unchanging model space is usually thought of as a 
gradual process with the posterior beliefs some sort of compromise between the peak of the 
  
prior beliefs and the model judged most likely by the data alone ( Leamer , 1987 ) . In other 
words , the Bayesian approach implicitly assumes that the dimensions of the internal mental 
models used to represent the external world are correct  in some sense ( see also Kalai E. , and 
Lehrer E. , 1990 ) . The connectionist approach ( Hutchins E. , and Hazlehurst B. , 1992 ) and 
the classification models used by Holland et al. (1986 ) instead assume that the fundamental 
issue is to determine the relevant dimensions of reality for one's decision or learning purposes . 
For the learner , these dimensions are identified in large part by the existing shared mental 
models . A set of prior beliefs about action-outcome mappings is being learned as part of the 
shared mental model , whether traditional culture or ideology . Contrary to the Bayesian 
learner who is never surprised , or forced within the updating process to completely change the 
dimensions of the model space , connectionist approach admits such surprises . Surprises or 
drastically revised models can be interpreted as the change in mental models or in our " framed 
" or " representational " knowledge of the reality . This involves trajectories which can be 
described as punctuated equilibria of the sort analyzed in Denzau and Grossman ( 1993 ) , 
Denzau and North ( 1994a ) , and in the litterature concerning technical change in the United 
States ( see Nelson R. 1994 ). " Punctuated equilibrium involves long periods of slow , gradual 
change punctuated by relatively short periods of dramatic changes , which we can presume to 
be periods of representational redescription " ( Danzau and North , 1994a , p.23 ) . The 
authors of the connectionist approach have illustrated the patterns of learning . According to 
Hutchins and Hazlehurst , both direct learning and the culturally mediated learning show 
patterns of punctuation ( figures 7 , 10 , and 11 in Hutchins and Hazlehurst ) . The punctuated 
equilibrium approach underlines the evolutionary process of changes in the meaning of words , 
concepts and the bringing of new meanings from related mental models , by analogy or 
metaphor . Hence , this approach tries to capture the role of novelty , surprise , institutions and 
radical shifts in the dimensions of the model space of our " representations " or " framed " 
knowledge . Learning as a change in mental model cannot be captured by Arrow's model of 
learning . New approaches , such as the connectionist and the punctuated equilibrium ones are 
more promising.  
 
3) Parametric Uncertainty and Structural Uncertainty: Future knowledge is by its nature 
unknown and the results of research and development are uncertain in the most radical sense. 
This insurmountable difficulty in the specification of outcomes means that it is unlikely that 
developed futures markets for innovations and knowledge could ever exist. Prediction of 
specific events in a complex and uncertain world is severely constrained and generally 
analytically irreducible to probabilistic risk or parametric uncertainty. The existence of 
structural uncertainty in these and other areas means that "the future is not reducible to the 
present- for instance by means of probabilities" ( Hodgson G., 1993-94, p. 10 ). For this 
reason, markets cannot cope adequately with technological development and they often 
  
eschew uncertainties. Of course, in the case of "learning-by-doing", it is possible to express 
learning by a systematic shift in the firm's production function. However, the innovation cannot 
be reduced to "learning-by-doing" ( Morishima M., 1992, p. 6 ). While "learning-by-doing" 
mainly involves a parametric uncertainty, innovation bears radical or structural uncertainty. 
 
4) Individualistic Conception of Knowledge : Whilst Smith recognized the benefits of the 
division of labor through some enhancement of skills ( "learning-by-doing" ), what is missing in 
his writings is an idea of corporate culture and the organization's role in the generation, 
transmission and protection of practical knowledge. Marx, however, considered the modern 
capitalist factory as "the power of collective worker" appropriated by the capital against the 
individual alienated worker (Capital, Vol.I, 1978, p. 281). Instead, Smith writes of "the 
increase of dexterity in every particular workman". This individualistic concepts of knowledge 
is also present in the Arrow's theory. That the knowledge within a corporation relates 
essentially to the organization and the group, rather than to the individuals composing them, is 
significantly emphasized by Sidney Winter. He writes : "The coordination displayed in the 
performance of organizational routines is, like that displayed in the exercise of individual skills, 
the fruit of practice. What requires emphasis is that... the learning experience is a shared 
experience of organization members... Thus, even if the contents of the organizational memory 
are stored only in the form of memory traces in the memories of individual members, it is still 
an organizational knowledge in the sense that the fragment stored by each individual member is 
not fully meaningful or effective except in the context provided by the fragments stored by 
other members." ( Winter, 1982, p. 76 ) 
 
Since learning and communication of employees take place only within the organizational 
framework, "their knowledge, as well as their capacities to communicate with each other are 
not individually portable" ( Winter, 1982, p. 45 ). Contrary to the view of information and 
knowledge as portable, knowledge is embedded in social structures. This is partly because 
learning is an "instituted process of interpretation, appraisal, trial, feedback, and evaluation, 
involving socially-transmitted cognitive forms and routinized group practices" ( Hodgson, 
1993-1994, p. 14 ). 
 
Winter's argument about the group nature of much organizational knowledge suggests that 
although tacit or other knowledge must reside in the nerve or brain cells of a set of human 
beings, its enactment depends crucially on the existence of a structured context in which 
individuals interact with each other. Otherwise, no such knowledge can become operational. 
Furthermore, because organizational knowledge is tacit knowledge, by definition it cannot be 
expressed in a codified form. The knowledge becomes manifest only through the interactive 
  
practice of the members of the group. It is both learned and transmitted in a group context 
only. 
 
Arrow also contends that : " social variables , not attached to particular individuals , are 
essential in studying the economy or any other social system and that , in particular , 
knowledge and technical information have an irremovably social component , of increasing 
importance over time . " ( Arrow , 1994 , p.8 ) . The " social component " of knowledge 
notwithstanding , Arrow maintains that " methodological individualism " and " rational 
behavior " must not be neglected in treating  " social knowledge " , communication networks 
and organizational designs. 
 
Since an organization , by definition , is composed of a multiplicity of individuals , there are 
necessarily at least two places for rationality to enter the discussion . One is at the individual 
level . Given an organization and its rules of operation , including rewards and punishements , 
one may want to assume that individuals behave rationally and to examine the implications of 
that assumption . For Arrow , " rationally " , in this cotext , " is taken to be individualistically 
rational . Individuals are assumed to maximise a utility function based on their own 
consumption , including that in the future and under uncertainty , under constraints imposed by 
organizational rules and incentives " ( Arrow , 1991 , p.2 ).  
 
Typically this assumption of rationality among the individuals within an organization , whom 
we call its agents , is accompanied by a more or less formal attempt to choose the operating 
rules of the organization so as to achieve some specified goal , for instance maximizing 
expected discounted profits , or minimizing the governance costs . According to Arrow , " 
sometimes this is done in a highly formal manner , as in the research area now known as ' 
principal-agent theory '. Sometimes it is done less formally and with closer attention to 
institutional detail , as in the work of Williamson ... in which both the ability of individuals to 
profit from the operating rules and the possibility of designing organizational rules to motivate 
individual self-seeking to the benefit of the organization's aims are explored" ( Arrow, 1991, 
p.2 ). 
 
There is another tradition , which ignores individual incentives . It is called " team theory " as 
set forth in The Economic Theory of Teams ( Marschak and Radner , 1972 ) . The goal of 
this theory is to be able to compare alternative designs by a two-step method . First , for each 
given design , we find the optimal mode of functioning for the organization . Second , the cost 
of operating the communication process is to be subtracted from the optimized objective 
function of each design , and their net values compared . The Economic Theory of Teams did 
not actually carry out this program . As Green and Laffont have noted , team theory , " did set 
  
up some useful definitions , and it provided some important results on the first of these steps . 
But the second step , cost assessment and comparison , was not really attempted , despite a 
clear view of the problem" ( Green and Laffont , 1986b , p.256 ). In Arrow's viewpoint, the 
difference between " team theory " in one hand and " principal-agent theory " and "transaction 
cost theory" on the other hand is not sharp. However, "in practical development, it is easier to 
study the implications of complex informational structures in the team context, simply because 
we can bypass the difficulty created by incentive compatibility constraints, which are generally 
difficult to handle." (Arrow, 1991, p.3). Relying on a team approach, Arrow tries to show that 
the possibility that elite control is connected with economies of scale in the process by which 
information is communicated. Hence, it will pay to reduce the number of individuals among 
whom information is to be communicated and have each transmit more.  
 
Undoubtedly, Arrow's theory of scale returns in communication is a brilliant idea which calls 
for new models of "optimal communication", since standard models usually lead to what 
amounts to diminishing returns, in which case there will be no gains in excluding a large 
number of individuals from the process. It is noteworthy that even Green and Laffont (1986), 
who set forth in their model of alternative limited communication systems, the task of 
removing the main pitfall of "team theory", namely cost assessment and comparison of 
different information structures, assume that "the costs of coding and decoding are identical 
and do not involve increasing returns." (Green and Laffont, 1986b, p.256, underlined by us). 
This assumption is well in the tradition of team theory. As stressed by Arrow (1982) : "team 
theory assumes a fixed amount of communication in fixed channels. The costs of 
communication are modelled by scarcity." Diminishing or non-increasing returns in 
communication costs is the common assumption of many standard models, including team 
theory.  
 
Actually, natural models for communication costs are derived from statiscal theory. One 
approach is to analogize a message to a random sample. Suppose one is seeking to estimate a 
random variable X. One is permitted to take a sample of n observations, each of which is an 
observation of X with a random error u normally distributed with mean 0. If successive errors 
are independent, then from a Bayesian viewpoint the variance of the best posterior estimation 
of X is a decreasing function of 1/n. More specifically , if we define the precision of an 
estimate as the reciprocal of its variance , then precision is a linear function of n. Precision is 
clearly a measure of information in a decision problem. If we assume that the cost is 
proportional to n, then we can infer that the cost of information is linear in precision ( viz the 
marginal cost of precision is a constant ). On the other hand, the extent to which the decision 
falls short of the best possible if the true value of X were known might reasonably depend on 
the variance ( namely,the reciprocal of the precision ). Hence the marginal benefit from 
  
precision is decreasing. Thus, if we think of the cost of communication as linear in the 
precision of the message, we can find an optimal level of communication.The choice of optimal 
level is a well-behaved problem in that the benefit function is a concave and the cost function 
linear.The well-known Shannon measure of information has several interpretations ; one of 
them is a cost measure-the cost of finding the correct item among a class when the probability 
that each one is the correct item is known-and the search procedure consists of successive 
dichotomies of the class to test in which subclass the correct item is. 
 
This interpretation is particularly applicable to messages, where each successive symbol 
amounts to identifying a subclass of possible messages among the set defined by the preceeding 
symbols.This is an alternative to precision as a measure of information, with advantages and 
disadvantages ; but again it typically gives rise to well-behaved decision choices. The picture 
that emerges from these two models is that of successively decreasing benefits to 
communication. Whereas according to Arrow, "a message has a syntactic and narrative 
structure. A small part of the message conveys virtually nothing useful. The communication 
theory picture, in which the first symbols restricts the field of possibilities, the second restricts 
it further, and so on, is of course formally correct. However, in terms of use value, the opening 
symbols may tell us virtually nothing useful. It is not for nothing that, in the messages 
conveyed by accounting, the interesting part is the "bottom line". In short, it would appear that 
we have increasing returns to the length of the message. This is of course a very imprecise 
statement, for the very definition of returns to scale implies that we have numerical measures 
of input and output. At the present time, this statement must be regarded...as a statement that 
the optimal joint choice of communication channels and decision rules based on them is a non 
concave problem... For example, zero communication may be better than a little bit" ( 
Arrow,1991,p.5 ). The emphasis on the syntactic and narrative structure of message for 
concluding the scale returns in communication is undoubtedly a great revolution inside the 
individualistic and static analytical framework of team theory. However, it is yet far from an 
interactive and dynamic vision of communication channels, and dynamic organizations ( for a 
Saussurian interpretation of interactive relation, see Nooteboom B. ,1992 ). 
 
Formulated in the seventies, team theory makes in fact the second stage in the economics of 
information centered on comparing communication networks. In the first stage, the issue was 
the design and evaluation of communication processes. The economy was depicted as 
continually changing. A good system of communication was one that could quickly  and 
accurately disseminate information about its current state. Writers such as von Hayek (1945) 
wanted to evaluate the price system in this informational role. Emphasis was primarily on the 
continued flow of new information, and on the transitory character of the state of the 
economy. Whereas the theory of teams dropped the concepts of information flow about a 
  
continually changing state in favor of a more static view, with the exception of chapter 7 in 
Marshack and Radner (1972) which was later developed by the agency school. As Green and 
Laffont correctly observe : "The state of the system was fixed, and team members each 
possessed different information about it. This was in the tradition of statistical decision theory, 
where one regards the parameters of a distribution as unknown, and seeks optimal responses to 
the available information...Marshak and Radner tried to study the question of optimal 
communication structure within the team. However, it is fair to say that most of their results 
concern the characterization of the optimal decision rule for a fixed communication structure, 
rather than this comparison." ( Green and Laffont, 1986a, p.240 ). 
 
The third stage begins with the contributions of agency theorists and transaction cost 
economics in the second half of the seventies and during the eighties.The major part of studies 
in this stage has been consacrated to the comparison of organisational designs and 
communication channels in their static states.Comparative statics, and not a dynamic analysis, 
was developed.These studies involved the explicit introduction of differences in objectives 
among the agents. Communication problems of a technplogical nature were largely ignored. 
Instead, most attention was directed at the problem of providing the incentives  necessary to 
make the self-interested agents divulge their information. The idea of a communication 
network was no longer pursued. 
 
To recapitulate this development, we have seen that the ideas of information as a flow and of 
communication as a comlex network design problem have been replaced by a static view of the 
system and a costless technology for information transmission. The contributions of the third 
stage tried to reintroduce the idea of information as a flow to study the interaction of 
communication constraints and incentives question. However many problems remain 
unresolved and call for a fourth stage in economics of information in order to capture the 
dynamics of organizations, institutions, and culture through time. For instance, the analysis of 
information as a flow through time brings us to the study of learning in general and collective 
learning or culture in particular. Furthermore, a more profound treatement of incentive 
structure shows that it is determined by institutional environment and arrangements of a 
society. As North correctly points out : "Incentives embodied in belief systems as expressed in 
institutions determine economic performance through time, and however we wish to define 
economic performance the historical record is clear" ( North D.,1994b,p.364 ). 
 
Despite his influential discovery of scale returns to communication, Arrow's analysis of 
communication channels and organization designs suffers from two serious shortcomings : (1)it 
is static and does not consider the information as a flow (2)it neglects not only the incentive 
structure but also institutions. Occasionally, Arrow refers to culture as some kind of 
  
"information" or "constraint" that causes the individual to act one way rather than another. 
Whereas culture is not simply information affecting individuals. It consists not merely of beliefs 
and assumptions, but also behavior patterns, habits, language and signs, even rituals and 
patterns of behavior. Moreover, the kind of "information" that is used and transmitted in a 
culture is embedded in social structures and organizations, in the sense that its existence and 
transmission depend upon them. Even the kind of information held by a single individual is 
typically context dependent ; information and structure are mutually interwined ( Hodgson G. 
,1993, p.253 ). It is thus difficult to locate culture in individuals. Culture and institutions 
transcend the individuals to whom they relate. By seeing culture as a structured and interactive 
belief-action system its collective quality can be appreciated. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Economics of information owe much to Alfred Marshall rather than Léon Walras. It was 
Marshall who considered information, particularly technical knowledge as a prime example of 
what we have come to call externalities. Roughly speaking, these are social interactions not 
mediated through the market. Arrow's description of information as a specific non-ordinary 
commodity, revealing the limits or imperfections of market and entering into the general 
category of "externalities" is rooted in the Marshallian tradition. This means also that Arrow in 
his discussion of knowledge and information as social as well as individual characteristics 
remains wholeheartedly faithful to methodological individualism of standard economic theory. 
Arrow set forth some fundamental principles of the economics of information and the new 
microeconomics by focussing on issues such as information gathering, communication 
efficiency, and transmission costs in deciding among forms of economic organisation. Arrow's 
model of learning-by-doing, his subtle observation of scale returns to communication, his 
analysis of education as sorting and screening, his treatement of the relationships between the 
competitive allocation mechanism and other planning procedures and their corresponding 
advantages and disadvantages with regard to the centralization of information are among the 
major contributions which permitted a systematic scientific treatement of economics of 
information. One reason for the rapid acceleration of this type of economic theory is the wide 
applicability it has found in other areas of economics. Problems of optimal taxation, sorting and 
screening, adverse selection in insurance, employment contracting, the theory of auctions, 
among others, have all been shown to be special cases of the general information transmission 
problem. However, there is another reason which in our opinion guarantees its increasing 
importance during the coming decades.  
 
Describing the new features of capitalism since the late sixties, many authors have suggested a 
variety of titles, such as post-industrial society, late capitalism, multi-national corporations 
  
capitalism, monopoly-state capitalism, etc. In some respects, I prefer to call this new capitalism 
as information capitalism, in order to underline the collective force of scientific knowledge 
being applied as directly as ever to production by the aid of third technological revolution in 
electronics and computer science. Information capitalism depends not on the regimentation of 
labor into a commodity; instead it depends on a new ability to transmit and transform 
information,and to connect people and ideas in new ways. The new product of this information 
capitalism is the complex merchandises and productive networks which comprise many 
interconnected processes of production and service, among them data marketing business and 
the internet (see "Year of the Internet", Newsweek, Dec. 25, 1995 / Jan.1, 1996 ). There are 
more and more examples of firms whose primary value is the possession of an informational 
advantage. The private property essential to the firm is eroded by the public access to the 
information which is part of that property. Arrow's statement concerning the 
"inappropriability" of information shows its practical relevance in this context. Since we are 
going to see new forms of property with aspects of both private and public goods related to 
this information capitalism.The difficulty to precise the "intellectual property" as included in 
the last Uruguay Round of G.A.T.T. is one of the first signals of the importance of the new 
forms of property in international commerce. Externalities, of course, cover many things as 
diverse as environmental issues, air and water pollution, global warning, toxic wastes, as well 
as information. However information as "externalities" in an epoch of information capitalism 
implies a radical change in institutions, particularly in the property rights. In the whole history 
of capitalism, it was never so difficult to demarcate a division line between "private" and 
"public" as it is in the era of information capitalism.  
 
Given the significance and dimension of the problem, it is questionable whether the 
"externalities" is an appropriate concept to explain information or non-market social 
interactions in general. More generally, the great challenge for neoclassical paradigms is 
whether its methodological individualism is capable to come to grips with the collective or 
social nature of information.New knowledge is acquired in two different ways : (1) acquisition 
from observing nature (2) learning from other individuals. As Arrow correctly remarks it is 
indeed the first of these two modes of information acquisition that fits well into the 
individualistic paradigms ( Arrow K., 1994, p.8 ) . However, the second mode, viz learning 
from others present many pecularities that do not match with neoclassical paradigms. The 
subtle observation of Arrow regarding the increasing returns to communication is one of those 
pecularities which contradicts the scarcity of information. Bounded rationality is another 
example. As far as bounded rationality refers to the limited capacity of individuals to collect 
and treat information, it can be accepted by individualistic paradigm. However, whenever it 
consists of "framed" knowledge, tacit and routinized knowledge, or culture as a structured and 
interactive belief-action system the individualistic approach is not so promising. Institutions, 
  
rather than individuals, are perhaps a better beginning for the appraisal of social nature of 
information, its context dependence, and its flow through time. 
 
In our critical review of Arrow's theory of information, we tried to show that despite its great 
achievements, this theory lacks the tacit, institutionalized, unexpected and non-rational 
dimensions of knowledge. The organizational or corporate culture cannot be derived from 
market failure or market imperfection. It is the direct outcome of internal organization of firm 
and other social networks, and thus closely related to learned and transmitted knowledge in a 
group context. Hence knowledge does not simply reflect the limits of market (as suggested by 
Arrow, 1974), and the presence of parametrical uncertainty5, it implies the power of 
organization and networks in the face of radical uncertainty. 
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